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THE MOST VISIBLE VESTIGE: BLACK
COLLEGES AFTER FORDICEt
LELAND WARE*
INTRODUCTION
There exists today a chance for the Negroes to organize a
cooperative State within their own group. By letting Negro
farmers feed Negro artisans, and Negro technicians guide
Negro home industries, and Negro thinkers plan this integra-
tion of cooperation, while Negro artists dramatize and beau-
tify the struggle, economic independence can be achieved.'
This comment appeared in a series of controversial editorials in
1934 in The Crisis, the NAACP's in-house publication. At the time, it
was perceived that W.E.B. DuBois' essays advocated black separatism. 2
They provoked an unprecedented storm of controversy within the
ranks of the NAACP which eventually culminated in DuBois' resigna-
tion. The interpretation that was given—that DuBois was acquiescing
in continued segregation—was erroneous. What he advocated was the
preservation of black institutions. The same question that DuBois
posed in the 1930s has been raised more recently in litigation involving
publicly-funded black colleges.'
In United States v. Fordice, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether states that maintained racially segre-
gated systems of higher education are obligated to take steps beyond
adopting race-neutral admission policies to desegregate their educa-
tional institutions.'' The Court rejected a standard that would have
t Copyright 1994, Leland Ware.
* Associate Professor, St. Louis University School of Law. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Prof: Michael Olivas, University of Houston Law Center, for his thoughtful
comments and suggestions.
1 W.E.B. DuBois, A Negro Nation Within Me Nation, 42 CURRENT HIST. 265, '270 (1935).
2 Cf. W.E.B. DuBois, Postscript, 41 TILE CRISIS '20, '20 (1934) (DuBois argues against discrimi-
nation, not segregation per se, and argues that blacks should associate together but resist unequal
treatment).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); Knight v, Alabama, 1994 WL 34937
(11th Cir. 1994).
4 11`2 S. Ct. at 2736. For a detailed discussion of the Ayers v. Main litigation and its
culmination in United States v. Fordice, see Lorne Ficnherg, Note, United States v. Fordice and
the Desegregation of Public Higher Education: Groping for Root and Branch, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 803
(1993).
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permitted compliance by the adoption of race-neutral policies alone. 5
Although states are obligated to do more, how much more remains
unclear. A question implicit in Fordice is whether there is a continuing
justification for publicly-funded black colleges and whether the opera-
tion of these institutions as facilities with a racially-distinct educational
perspective can be justified in light of the desegregation principle of
Brown v. Board of Education. 6
 This Article attempts to answer that
question.
Section 1 describes the origins of black colleges during the Recon-
struction period.' Section II examines the development of the NAACP's
legal challenge to segregated education and the graduate school cases
that were brought beginning in the mid-1930s. 8 As Section 11 explains,
these cases were part of a gradualist approach which demanded equal
educational opportunities within the confines of the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. 9
 The success of these cases pro-
vided a foundation for the direct challenge that succeeded in Brown.
Sections [II and IV examine the post-Brown era.'°As the discussion
in those sections indicates, higher education cases during this period
focused primarily on whether the affirmative duty that applied to
primary and secondary schools should extend to colleges and univer-
sities. Enrollment in institutions of higher learning is analytically dis-
tinguishable from attendance at lower level schools because it is not
the product of direct state action. This distinction caused disagreement
among the lower courts. After years of debate, the Supreme Court held
in Fordice that neutral polices will not suffice." The implications for
black colleges remain unclear.
Supporters of black colleges believe that these institutions are
uniquely effective in educating African-American students.' 2 They con-
tend that black colleges should not be closed or otherwise penalized
for the states' discriminatory actions. Opponents of this view maintain
that black colleges are merely remnants of a discriminatory system that
inhibit current efforts to integrate schools. A larger question concerns
the meaning of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
5 1d.
6
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
8
 See infra notes 23-96 and accompanying text.
9
 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10 See infra notes 97-109, 110-282 and accompanying text.
" 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
12
 For purposes of this Article, the term "black college" denotes institutions that were estab-
lished as segregated institutions prior to 1954. It should be noted, however, that white students
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extent to which desegregation necessarily involves a racial balance of
some sort. The paradox of black colleges (in light of their demon-
strated efficacy) is whether there is a legal justification for the contin-
ued existence of institutions that were originally established to pro-
mote segregation. This question is explored in the final sections of this
Article.
As discussed in Section IV, black colleges provide a valuable edu-
cational experience for African-American students.' 3 These institutions
provide nurturing environments that are free from the racial tension
that is so prevalent on many college campuses in the United States.
Black colleges have successfully educated generations of black leaders
and they continue to provide an irreplaceable service. The elimination
of these institutions would decrease the number of black students
attending institutions of higher learning, because it would diminish
the range of educational opportunities presently available to them.
More importantly, African-American culture and accomplishment are
integral components of the educational programs at black colleges.
These attributes cannot be replicated at white universities, where black
students are an isolated minority and where the curriculum is indiffer-
ent to the contributions of black Americans to art, literature and the
sciences. Black colleges should not be sacrificed to promote desegre-
gation efforts which define success solely in terms of the percentages
of black students enrolled in white institutions. This is too superficial
a measure to determine whether true educational equality has been
achieved.
I. THE HISTORY OF BLACK COLLEGES
The first black colleges were established in the North before the
Civil War by Christian missionaries and church groups who were moved
by the lack of educational opportunities available to blacks at the
time." The next significant landmark in the creation of black colleges
occurred at the close of the Civil War, when large scale efforts were
undertaken to provide freed slaves with a basic education. Before the
Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, efforts by Christian missionaries
to provide educational facilities were discouraged in the South, where
attend these institutions, the faculties are integrated and they do not have race-exclusive admis-
sion policies. The term "white college" refers to institutions which do not satisfy this definition.
13 See infra notes 3'24-30 and accompanying text.
14 Cheney College was founded in the 1830s; Lincoln College in 1854; Wilberfince College
in 1856. Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era
of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. '19, 37 & n.24 (1987).
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it was illegal to educate slaves.' 5 When this barrier fell with the Con-
federacy, Northern missionaries became active in the South. Close to
one hundred black public and private institutions were established in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 16 Most of these were
established in the seventeen Southern and border states, where nearly
all of the freed slaves continued to reside.
Before the Civil War, few colleges were established to serve black
students, and not many white colleges would admit African-Americans.
At that time, higher education in the United States had been pro-
vided primarily by private, sectarian institutions serving the wealthy
and professional classes. As a result of the efforts of Vermont congress-
man Justin Morrill and others determined to make higher educa-
tion more than an elite private reserve, the First Morrill Act was prom-
ulgated in 1862. The Act provided each state with a federal land
grant which was to be used to create a perpetual fund to endow
institutions whose leading objective would be the promotion of liberal
and practical education for the industrial classes. 17 Although the crea-
tion of land grant colleges marked the beginning of a revolution in
higher education, most of the benefits of the early land grant move-
ment did not reach the black populations of the seventeen segrega-
tionist states.' 8
With its enactment in 1890, the Second Morrill Act provided some
assurance that blacks would not be denied the benefits of the land
grant system.'9 This Act required that states either provide separate
educational facilities for black students or admit them to existing
colleges." In response, all of the Southern and border states chose to
establish separate schools for black students. Six states created new
institutions to satisfy the Act. Others merely designated existing schools
as those institutions required under the Act, or allocated a portion of
federal land grant funds to private black colleges. 2 ' Nevertheless, the
Second Morrill Act eventually led to the establishment of at least one
public black college in each of the Southern states." Thus, black public
colleges evolved out of the states' desires to secure federal funding and
15 JACQUELINE FLEMINCI, BLACKS IN COLLEGE 4 (1984).
16 KLIjoViC11, Supra note 14, at 37-38.
1.2 Id. at 41.
l 'Only Mississippi, Virginia and South Carolina shared the 1862 federal land grant endow-
ment with colleges that educated black citizens after the First Morrill Act. Id. at 42.
19 /d.
Kujovich, supra note 14, at 42-43.
21 Id. at 43.
22 Id.
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avoid admitting blacks to existing white institutions. The black institu-
tions were demonstrably inferior to the white colleges.
By the turn of the century, under the impetus of the Second
Morrill Act and the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine of "separate but equal,"
the structure of the public higher education system was well established
in the former Confederate states. Although the public colleges were
separate, they were far from equal. Black colleges were denied the
funds necessary to provide educational services at a level equivalent to
their white counterparts. This system remained substantially the same
until the NAACP mounted its full-scale assault against segregated edu-
cation.
H. THE PRE-BROWN GRADUATE SCHOOL CASES
In the early 1930s, the NAACP embarked on a long-range, care-
fully planned litigation campaign in which laws requiring racial segre-
gation were systematically challenged in courts across the United States."
This effort ultimately resulted in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, where the Court held that
segregation in public schools was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Before attacking segregation
and the Plessy doctrine directly, however, the NAACP embarked on a
gradualist strategy of insisting that the separate educational facilities
provided for black students be equal, physically and otherwise, to those
afforded to white students. 25 The "equalization" strategy was intended
to force the courts to grapple with the inequities of the segregated
system without risking a reaffirmation of Plessy. After a series of victo-
ries in the United States Supreme Court over a period of several years,
an adequate body of precedent was established and the organization
was poised to mount a direct challenge to segregation itself. 26 The
pre-Brown cases involved graduate education, an area where the states
were most vulnerable. Several states had established similar separate
undergraduate facilities for black students, but almost none had estab-
lished institutions for graduate or professional training. The NAACP
assumed that the elimination of de jure segregation would result auto-
matically in educational equality. This was not to be the case.
23 See, e.g., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 352 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex re/. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
24 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
25 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipttel, 332 U.S. 631.
26 See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
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A. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada
The first of the graduate school cases to reach the United States
Supreme Court was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada. 27 The plaintiff in
that case, Lloyd Gaines, was a 1935 graduate of Lincoln University who
wanted to attend law school. 28 After the University of Missouri denied
his application, he filed a civil action against the State of Missouri.
During the trial, the State admitted that Gaines' admission was denied
solely on the basis of his race, but the circuit court of Boone County
entered a judgment for the University. 29 The case was later appealed
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which noted that "the established
public policy of this State has been, and now is, to segregate the white
and negro races."5°
Gaines' lawyers claimed that the State's actions had violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After explain-
ing somewhat cryptically that "color carries with it natural race pecu-
liarities," and that "[t]hese differences create different social rela-
tions," the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on Plessy v. Ferguson to
conclude that "[e]quality, and not identity of privileges and rights, is
what is guaranteed to the citizen."' Based on this reasoning, the court
held that Gaines would not be deprived of any constitutional rights as
long as the educational opportunities provided by the State were "sub-
stantially equal to those furnished white citizens of the State. "52 The
court also found that, because the State had created an out-of-state
scholarship fund for black students, "the opportunity offered [Gaines]
for a law education in the university of an adjacent State is substan-
tially equal to that offered to white students by the University of Mis-
souri."33
27 305 U.S. 337 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 676 (1939).
23 For a history of the NAACP's strategy in the Gaines trial, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 202-04 (1977); GENNA RAE MCNEII„ GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUS-
TON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL. RIGHTS 143-44 (1983). See also Lucille H. Bluford, The Lloyd
Gaines Story, 52 J. Eouc. Soctowov 242, 243 (1959); Larry Grothaus, The Inevitable Mr. Gaines,
26 ARIZoNA ANn Tub: WEST 21 (1984); University of Missouri Case Won, 46 THE CRISIS 10, 10
(1939).
29 State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 784-85 (Mo. 1937), reu'ri, 305 U.S. 337
(1938).
3° Id. at 785.
51 Id. at 788 (quoting Lehew v. Bronunell, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (Mo. 1891)).
22 I at 789.
35 Id. at 790.
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Gaines was appealed to the United States Supreme Court." The
State argued that Gaines was not entitled to admission to the University
of Missouri because "if, on the date when [Gaines] applied for admis-
sion to the University of Missouri, he had instead applied to the
curators of Lincoln University it would have been their duty to establish
a law school."35
 The Supreme Court found no such "mandatory duty"
because the statute on which the State relied left "to the judgment of
the hoard of curators to determine when it would be necessary or
practicable to establish a law school." 50
 More importantly, the Court
recognized the actual effect of the State's actions, stating that "the fact
remains that instruction in law for negroes is not now afforded by the
State, either at Lincoln University or elsewhere within the State."'
Based on these findings, the Court reasoned that the critical issue was
"whether the provision for the legal education in other States of ne-
groes resident in Missouri is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of equal protection."8
In the Court's view, the quality of legal education provided by
other states was irrelevant." The question to be resolved was "what
opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to
negroes solely upon the ground of color." 4° The Court found that each
state had an independent constitutional obligation to provide equal
educational opportunities, and that this requirement could not be
shifted by one state to another.'" The Court also held that the right to
equal protection is a "personal one."42 Therefore, "the State was bound
to furnish [Gaines] within its borders facilities for legal education
substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons
of the white race."43
 Because the State had not established a separate
law school for black students, the Supreme Court held that Gaines was
entitled to admission to the University of Missouri."
Gaines was significant because it provided the NAACP with a much
needed organizational lift and it vindicated the organization's litiga-
34 See 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
"Id. at 346.
" Id. at 346-47.
57 Id. at 345.
38 Id. at 348.
" See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 350.
42 1d. at 351.
43 /d.
44 Gaines,
 305 U.S. at 352.
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Lion strategy. For the first time, the Supreme Court had ordered the
admission of a black student to a segregated university. After Gaines,
states could not continue to ignore their constitutional obligation to
provide higher educational opportunities for black students, even if
those opportunities were provided on a segregated basis. The implica-
tions were far-reaching and resulted in the immediate enhancement
of graduate training opportunities for black students. 45
After Gaines, the NAACP focused its efforts on salary equalization
cases in which suits were brought to force the states to equalize the
salaries paid to black and white school teachers. The pace of these and
other civil rights cases was slowed somewhat by World War II. After the
War's conclusion, however, the organization renewed its efforts.
B. Sipuel v. Board of Regents
The first of the post- Gaines graduate school cases was filed against
the University of Oklahoma in April of 1946. 46 From a field of several
potential litigants, the NAACP settled on Ada Louise Sipuel to serve
as the plaintiff. Sipuel was an honors graduate of the State College for
Negroes in Langston, Oklahoma. 47 She had applied for admission to
the University of Oklahoma School of Law but her application was
denied on the ground that the school did not admit black students. 48
After receiving the rejection, Sipuel filed a suit in an Oklahoma trial
court; the court, however, dismissed Sipuel's case. 49 On appeal, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, because Sipuel failed to demand
that the State establish a separate law school for black students, she
had no right to admission to the school established for white students. 5°
The court reasoned that Oklahoma was not obligated to establish a law
school for black students until there was a sufficient demand to justify
the expenditure of the funds that would be required.'''' Because Sipuel
45 Gaines never enrolled in the University of Missouri. He disappeared shortly after the case
was remanded to the trial court. Speculation concerning his whereabouts ranged from reports
of sightings in Mexico to reports of his death. All that is known is that he was last seen leaving
his fraternity house in Chicago. See Bluford, supra note 28, at 245-46; Grothaus, supra note 28;
WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE 162 (1948).
46 See MARK V. TUSf INET, THE NAACP's LEGAL. STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950, at 121 (1987).
47 WHITE, supra note 45, at 144.
48 See TUSHNET, supra note 46, at 120-21.
49 1d. at 121.
tt Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 180 P.2d 135,144 (Okla. 1947), reu'd, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
51 Id. at 139.
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had not made the necessary demand, she "wholly failed to establish
any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. "52
The NAACP sought review of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in the United States Supreme Court." Four days after it heard
oral arguments, the Court issued a decision which reversed the judge-
ment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 54 In a brief opinion, the Court
first noted that Sipuel's "application for admission was denied, solely
because of her color." 55 The Court then found that:
The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded
by a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her
although during the same period many white applicants have
been afforded legal education by the State. The State must
provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon
as it does for applicants of any other group."
Unwilling to retreat from its policy of segregation, the Oklahoma
Board of Regents responded by roping off an area in the state capitol
building, designating it as the "negro law school," and hiring three
black lawyers to serve as the fitculty. Sipuel's counsel, Thurgood Mar-
shall, returned to the Supreme Court to request that the Court find
that Oklahoma had not complied with the Court's original decision.
To the surprise and disappointment of the NAACP, the Supreme Court
ruled seven to two in favor of the State of Oklahoma. 51 Over the
vigorous dissent ofJustice Rutledge, the majority found that the State's
actions did not violate the Court's original order."
C. Sweatt v. Painter
At approximately the same time the NAACP was locked in battle
with the State of Oklahoma, an identical suit was filed on behalf of
another student in Texas. Heman Marion Sweatt, a letter carrier em-
52 1d. at 144.
" Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 631 (1948) (per curial n).
54 id, at 631, 633.
55 Id. at 632.
56 Id. at 632-33; See also Along the N.A.A.C.R Battlefront, 55 THE CRISIS 54, 54-55 (1948)
(discussing NAACP's role in Si/fuel).
57 See Fisher v. I lurst , 333 U.S. 147, 151 (1948); Along the N.A.A.C.P Battlefront, 55 THE CRISIS
84, 84 (1948).
58 Fisher, 333 U.S. at 150-51.
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ployed by the post office, applied for admission to the University of
Texas School of Law at Austin in 1946.° Sweatt's application was denied
because of his race.° On May 16, 1946, suit was filed in Texas state
courts' In June, the trial court held a hearing and issued an order
which gave the State six months to establish a law school for black
students.62
In response, the State rented a few rooms in Houston and hired
two black lawyers to serve as the faculty of the newly established branch
of Prairie View University, a school previously established to serve black
students.° At a status conference held in December of 1946, the trial
court found that the facilities at Houston were "substantially equal" to
those provided for white students at the Austin campus. 64
The NAACP appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas. 65
 While the appeal was pending, the State took steps
to bolster the trial court's finding that the black law school was "sub-
stantially equal" to the school established for white students. 66
 The
location of the black law school was transferred to Austin pending the
construction of a permanent facility in Houston. Three rooms in a
building across the street from the state capitol were set aside to house
the temporary facility. The black law students were given access to the
law library located at the state capitol, and professors from the Univer-
sity of Texas were assigned as instructors. 67 The Texas Legislature appro-
priated three and a half million dollars to construct a black university
and designated $100,000 of that fund for the construction of a separate
black law school.° Because of this change in circumstances, the case
was remanded to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing.°
Faced with a weakened case on the issue of physical inequality,
Thurgood Marshall chose a different tactic. This new approach be-
came critical to the Supreme Court's decisions in the final series of
graduate school cases and would provide the foundation for its holding
59 See Jonathan L. Entire, Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and the Transformation of
Education Law, 5 REv. Errn-. . 3, 7 (1986); see also Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 54 THE Oasis
149, 149 (1947).
641 Tusurgyr, supra note 46, at 126.
61 See Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 54 THE CRISIS 149, 149 (1947).
62 Id.
65 See TUSHNE:T, supra note 46, at 126.
64
 See Along the N.A.A.C.P Battlefront, 54 THE CRISIS, 182, 182 (1947).
65 Id.
66 See TusHNET, supra note 46, at 126.
67 Id.
68
 See Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 54 THE CRISIS 342, 343 (1947).
69 See TU SHNET, supra note 46, at 126.
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in Brown. 7" At the hearing, Marshall presented the testimony of an
array of expert witnesses who testified at length about the harmful
effects of segregation on the educational process. 71 One expert testified
about the importance to the learning process of interaction among
students." A professor, he explained, however well qualified, could not
provide those elements of the educational experience that are derived
from discussion and interaction among students."
Approximately one month after the trial ended, the court entered
a judgment for the defendants: 7^ The case was appealed to the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas. On February 25, 1948, that court issued a
decision affirming the trial court's ruling: 75 That decision was later
appealed to the United States Supreme Court." At the same time, the
Court heard the case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents."
D. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
The last of the major graduate school cases involved a sixty-eight
year old black professor at Langston University, George W. McLaurin,
who had applied to the graduate school of education at the University
of Oklahoma in 1948. After his application was denied, the NAACP
filed a suit on his behalf." McLaurin was heard by a three-judge panel
in the federal district court." That panel eventually ruled in favor of
the State of Oklahoma. The case was then appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court. 8°
Sweatt and McLaurin reached the Supreme Court at the same
time. McLaurin was argued on April 3rd and 4th, 1950, and oral
arguments in Sweatt were heard on April 4th. The decisions in both
cases were issued on June 501. 5' The Court in Sweatt declined to consider
whether "Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in light of contem-
70 See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71 Cf. Thomas 1. Emerson et al., Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause: Brief fir the
Committee of Law Thachers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN. L. REV. 289, 316-20
(1950) (reprint of antici curiae brief filed on behalf of the committee of law teachers in support
of Sweatt); see also Along the N.A.A.C.P Battlefront, 54 THE. CRISIS 342, 342-43 (1947).
72 KLuGEK, supra note 28, at 264.
73 Id.
71 Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2c1 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), reu'd, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
75 Id, at 447.
76 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) relik denied, 340 U.S. 846 (1950).
77 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
78 A lung the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefrmt, 55 TErE CRISIS 274, 274 (1948).
72 Id.
8° McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 637.
1' 1 Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 57 Till: CRISIS 444, 444 (1950).
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porary knowledge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the effects of racial segregation."82 Nevertheless, in two short
opinions, the Court came close to adopting the NAACP's position
concerning the inherent inequities of state-sponsored segregation.
In Sweatt, the Court determined that the facilities available at the
newly-established law school were not equal in either quantity or qual-
ity to those available at the law school in Austin." The Court noted
that, Tin terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and
opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of
Texas Law School is superior."84 The Court did not limit its analysis to
a comparison of physical resources but went on to conclude that the
quality of educational instruction was inevitably diminished by forced
separation. 85
 In the Court's view:
[T] he University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater
degree those qualities which are incapable of objective meas-
urement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such
qualities to name but a few, include reputation of the fac-
ulty, experience of the administration, position and influence
of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free
choice between these law schools would consider the question
close.86
Responding to the NAACP's expert testimony, the Court recog-
nized in Sweatt that there was more to education than bricks and
mortar.87
 Much of the educational process, it found, involved interac-
tion among students through discussion and the exchange of ideas. 88
This process could not occur in a system where one group of students
was isolated from other students. 89
The Court reached a similar conclusion in McLaurin. 9° McLaurin
was analytically different from Sweatt, because the State of Oklahoma
did not attempt to establish a separate facility for black students but
"Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636.
85 Id. at 633-34.
"Id.; see also Along the N.A.A.C.I Battlefront, 57 THE Ousts 444, 446 (1950).
85 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
86 Id,
87 See id.
88 Id.
89
"McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
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instead gave them access to the same instruction as whites, on a racially
segregated basis."' In McLaurin, however, the Supreme Court was re-
quired to determine whether segregation within a university violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' As the
Court's opinion explained:
[McLaurin] was required to sit apart at a designated desk in
an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated
desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the
desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated
table and to eat at a different time from the other students
in the school cafeteria.°
While the case was pending, certain modifications were made in the
arrangements to accommodate McLaurin:
For some time, the section of the classroom in which
[McLaurin] sat was surrounded by a rail on which there was
a sign stating, "Reserved For Colored," but these have been
removed. He is now assigned to a seat in the classroom in a
row specified for colored students; he is assigned to a table
in the library on the main floor; and he is permitted to eat.
at the same time in the cafeteria as other students, although
here again he is assigned to a special table."
These actions, the Court found, "handicapped [McLaurin] in his
pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views
with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.'" 5 The
final, and in some ways most compelling issue was raised by the State
of Oklahoma's actions in McLaurin. Because McLaurin was allowed to
sit in a classroom with and receive the same instruction as white
students, the isolation rationale of Sweatt did not apply. Yet, by roping
McLaurin off in a "colored only" section of the classroom and by
setting aside separate tables in the library and cafeteria, the State
graphically demonstrated the stigmatizing effects of segregation far
more graphically than any expert witness ever could."6
"I Id. at 639.
92 Id. at 642.
93 Id. at 640.
94 Id.
McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
• 6 While the case was pending, a photograph of McLaurin appeared in newspapers across
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By the time the NAACP proceeded with the primary school cases,
the thin veneer had been stripped from defenses raised by segrega-
tion's supporters. The separate facilities provided for black students
were demonstrably unequal. More importantly, the expert testimony
in McLaurin and Sweatt focused the Court's attention on the psycho-
logical effects of state-enforced segregation and the detrimental effects
that these practices had on the learning process. Once the courts were
forced to confront the stigma inflicted by state-sponsored segregation,
it became virtually impossible to reconcile segregated education with
the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, when the
Supreme Court held state enforced segregation to be unlawful, the
remedy that it ordered did not eliminate the inequities that formal
discrimination had created.
III. THE POST-BROWN ERA
In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court
held that racial segregation in public schools was inherently unequal
and constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 97
 Although nearly forty years have elapsed
since Brown was decided, educational opportunities for black students
are not much better now than they were in 1955, when the Court's
implementation decree was issued in Brown II." In the Southern states,
Brown was ignored or actively resisted for at least fifteen years. During
that time, delaying tactics prevented all but a handful of school systems
from becoming desegregated. 9° By the late 1960s, the United States
Supreme Court grew weary of Southern resistance. It abandoned the
"deliberate speed" standard of Brown II in favor of a standard requiring
immediate integration.'w The Court also held that localities that had
maintained de jure systems of segregation could not satisfy their con-
stitutional obligations merely by adopting "freedom of choice" poli-
the country. The picture shows a classroom at the University of Oklahoma. Sitting in an alcove,
McLaurin is leaning forward, peering into the classroom, apparently straining to hear the
discussion. Proving the axiom that "one picture is worth a thousand words," the photograph
shows just how demeaning segregation was in actual practice. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1948,
reprinted in MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION 908 (1989).
97 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
98 See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Supreme Court's order
implementing its judgment in Brown I). The Court ordered that desegregation of public schools
proceed with "all deliberate speed." Id. at 301.
99 For a detailed description of the Sane of Alabama's efforts to resist Brown, see Knight v.
Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1104-12 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
199 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968).
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cies.m The Court found that race-neutral policies such as "freedom of
choice" merely perpetuated the status quo.' 02 Further actions were
required to dismantle the elaborate system of racial segregation that
had prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century. Based on
this determination, the Court adopted a standard which required states
to dismantle segregated school systems "root and branch" until all
vestiges of the dual system were eliminatedP
It is, of course, impossible to know what results this approach
might have produced if it had been used in the implementation decree
that was entered in Brown II. By the late 1960s, demographic changes
made integration in elementary and secondary schools virtually impos-
sible. When Brown was decided, residential housing patterns were
already racially segregated. At the same time, population distributions
were in the midst of a dramatic change. White families previously
concentrated in industrial centers of the North and Midwest were
moving to the open spaces of the surrounding suburbs. With the
advent of school desegregation, the flight to the suburban areas accel-
erated.
The relocation of white families to outlying areas followed a mi-
gration of black families to the cities. During World War I, black
families began to migrate from rural areas in the deep South to urban
industrial centers, a trend which continued throughout World War II.
By the 1960s, the demographic patterns which persist to this day were
firmly locked in place. The vast majority of black families resided in
urban centers, while white families lived in suburban areas beyond the
city limits. Since school attendance was based on zones drawn along
the lines of residential districts, student populations in urban and
suburban schools reflected the segregated housing patterns that pre-
dominated most areas of the nation.' °4
lo Id. at 440.
1°2 See id. at 441.
1°3 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Rd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1970) (citing Green, 391
U.S. at 437-38).
1134 A recent study indicates that racial segregation in housing is far more pervasive than
previously believed and is growing rather than diminishing. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A.
Denton, Hypersegregalion in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five
Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373, 388 (1989). Using the term "hyper-segregation" to label this
phenomenon, the authors show that residents of inner city areas are now more isolated than ever
before and have drifted further from the mainstream of American society. Id. at 389. The findings
reported iit this article arc expanded and explored in greater depth in DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OE THE UNDERCLASS
(1993). The effects of segregation are not limited to families with poverty-level incomes. In a 1991
study, the Department of Housing and Urban Development found that blacks and hispanics
encountered some form of housing discrimination in more than half of their visits to inquire
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Matriculation at colleges and universities is not based on compul-
sory attendance zones; nevertheless, the racial tensions at these insti-
tutions reflect the fundamental polarization that pervades the United
States. Black students attend schools that were formerly attended only
by whites, but they do not find the warm and nurturing environments
which are conducive to learning. Despite years of recruitment and
affirmative action programs, the percentage of black students who
attend traditionally white colleges remains low. A much smaller per-
centage of the students who enroll actually graduate. Black students at
white colleges often choose to eat at separate dining tables. Many live
in separate dormitories and tend to socialize apart from white stu-
dents. t°5
Throughout the post-Brown era, federal courts have addressed the
desegregation obligation of former de jure states in cases involving
publicly-funded black colleges. 1 U6 The courts have proceeded from the
premise that desegregation requires the elimination of racially iden-
tifiable schools. 107 The debate has focused on whether the standard
used in primary and secondary school cases applies to higher educa-
tion, or whether a different standard should prevail. If the standard
used in primary and secondary schools is adopted, states would be
obligated to implement plans to eliminate all vestiges of racial segre-
gation. 1 °8 The methods available would include eliminating black col-
leges, merging black schools with white institutions and enrolling
sufficient numbers of white students so that formerly all-black colleges
are no longer racially identifiable.
By adopting a standard which requires states to eliminate all
remnants of racial segregation, the Supreme Court has chosen a path
that imperils the existence of publicly-funded black colleges, the most
visible vestige of the segregated system. This result is ironic because
the long-neglected and drastically under-funded black schools will, in
about housing. JOHN YINGER, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: INCIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
AND VARIATION IN DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR (1991).
"5 Mel Elfin & Sarah Burke, Race on Campus, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1993, at
52; Peter R. Pouncey, Reflections on Black Separatism at American Colleges, 1 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER
Enuc. 57 (1993); Black us, White Institutions of Higher Education, ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Aug. 27,
1992, at 64; Dennis A. Williams at al., The Bladt Mood on Campus, NEWSWEEK, No 8, 1982, at
107.
1 °6 See, e.g., Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368 (ED. Va. 1971), affd
sub nom. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971);
Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch. and College Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D.
Ala. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
107 See, e,g., Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1373; Alabama State Teachers Ass'n, '289 F. Supp. at 790.
118 See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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effect, be penalized, while the institutions which engaged in discrimi-
natory practices will benefit. Moreover, the elimination of black col-
leges will likely decrease the number of minority students who attend
colleges because it will diminish the range of educational opportunities
presently available to them. The courts have not given sufficient con-
sideration to this result. As the following Section demonstrates, the
success of desegregation has been measured almost exclusively by the
percentage of minority students enrolled in white colleges. This is not
an appropriate means of determining whether educational parity has
been achieved.m
IV. THE POST-BROWN HIGHER EDUCATION CASES
A. ASTA and the Neutrality Standard
In the 1968 case of Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama
Public School and College Authority ("AM"), an organization of black
teachers sought to prevent the establishment of a branch of Auburn
University in Montgomery, Alabama."" Alabama State Teachers Col-
lege, a publicly-funded black college, was located in the same city.
The plaintiffs in ASTA argued that a branch of Auburn located in
Montgomery would attract white students who might otherwise elect
to attend Alabama State Teachers College.'" This result, the plaintiffs
claimed, would interfere with Alabama's obligation to desegregate its
schools. 112
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Ala-
bama ruled against the plaintiffs after it concluded that the new insti-
tution would be operated in a non-segregated manner."' The court
declined to adopt the standard that the Supreme Court had imposed
in elementary and high school cases—that states are obligated to take
affirmative steps to eliminate segregation "root and branch" until all
vestiges of the dual system have been eliminated."' The court opted
mg For a discussion of the success of desegregation initiatives in public education, see gener-
ally Derrick A. Bell, jr., Black Colleges and the Desegregation Dilemma, 28 EMORY L.J. 949 (1979);
Kenyon D. Bunch & Grant B. Mindle, Testing the Limits of Precedent: The Application of Green to
the Desegregation of Higher Education, 2 SErox HALL. CoNs•r. L.J. 541 (1992); Drew S. Days DI,
Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY 1.. REV. 53 (1992).
11 °289 F. Supp. 784,785-86 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) there-
inafter AglAl.
111 See id. at 788-89.
"2 1d. at 789.
115 1d. at 789-90.
114 See id. at 787; Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968).
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instead for a less stringent standard. This approach was based on the
court's reasoning that a student's choice to attend college was purely
voluntary, whereas elementary and secondary education was compul-
sory." 5 As a consequence, the court found that the implementation of
race-neutral admissions and faculty and staff hiring policies were suf-
ficient to satisfy the state's desegregation obligation. 15 After the deci-
sion in ASTA, other cases were filed and a different standard emerged.
B. Norris: The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate
In 1971, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia enjoined Virginia's plan to expand Richard Bland College
from a two-year junior college into a four-year institution after a group
of plaintiffs contended that the State's actions would perpetuate Vir-
ginia's dual system of higher education. 17 The junior college was located
seven miles from Virginia State College, a black college located near
Petersburg, Virginia. Like the plaintiffs in ASIA, the plaintiffs in Norris
argued that the new institution would be viewed as a "white" school
and would attract students who might otherwise have attended Virginia
State College."8
The court in Norris declined to adopt the holding in ASTA that
the adoption of race-neutral admission policies was sufficient to satisfy
the state's desegregation obligations." `8 Instead, it held that a state's
duty in higher education was the same as that which the Supreme
Court applied to primary and secondary schools in Green.' 2° The Norris
court, therefore, found that the State of Virginia had an affirmative
duty to take whatever steps were necessary to convert its segregated
schools into a unitary system.' 2 ' In the court's view, the State's plan to
establish a new institution in such close proximity to a historically black
college violated its desegregation obligation because it would hamper
Virginia State's ability to recruit white students.' 22 After the Norris court
applied the Green standard to higher education, other courts followed
Norris' lead.'"
115 ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 787-89.
116 /d. at 789-90.
117 Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1369, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1971),
aff'd sub notn. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971).
119 See Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1369.
"9 Id. at 1372.
12° Id. at 1373 (citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968)).
121
 See id.
'22 Id.
129 See, e.g., Hunnicutt v. Burge, 356 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
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C. A Perception of Inferiority
Desegregation litigation has been premised on the assumption
that black colleges are inferior to their white counterparts. This pre-
sumption was evident in a case brought not long after the Norris
decision. In 1973, in Hunnicutt v. Burge, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that the State of Georgia
had violated its obligation to desegregate its colleges and universities
by allowing Fort Valley State College, a historically black college, to
continue to offer a marginal level of instruction.'" This holding was
based on the court's determination that Fort Valley's academic pro-
grams were demonstrably inferior to the programs available at nearby
white colleges.' 25 In the court's view, Fort Valley was so inferior that it
was little more than a "diploma mill" for marginal students. 126
Fearing that the litigation jeopardized the existence of their school,
several successful graduates of Fort Valley testified on the institution's
behalf.'" Their testimony was discounted, however, as was the college's
argument that it served a population of students who were academi-
cally under-prepared by Georgia's still-segregated elementary and high
schools. 128 The court in Hunnicutt applied the Green standard and
determined that the State had an affirmative duty to eliminate the
racial identity of the college.' 29 The adoption of race-neutral admission
policies was insufficient. The court thus ordered the State to develop
and implement a desegregation plan.''" The affirmative duty recog-
nized in Green continued to be applied in cases that were adjudicated
in the years following the Hunnicutt decision.
D. Equality Predicated on Racial Balance
Federal judges adjudicating desegregation litigation have assumed
that historically black colleges stand as obstacles to school desegrega-
tion. This assumption was reflected in the decade of litigation involving
Tennessee State University which concluded in 1979, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee which
124 Id. at 1230, 1238.
125 1d. at 1238.
126 See id. at 1230, 1238.
127 See id. at 1236, 1238.
12a See Hunnicutt, 356 F. Stipp. at 1236, 1238.
129 Id. at 1230.
150 id.
652	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:633
ordered the merger of Tennessee State University with the Nashville
branch of the University of Tennessee.' 3 '
Geier v. University of Tennessee commenced in 1968, when a group
of plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the expansion of the Nashville branch
of the University of Tennessee."2 Both schools were located in the
Nashville area. The University of Tennessee ("UT"), the State's flagship
institution, was founded in 1807. Tennessee State University ("TSU")
was established in 1912 to serve black students.
The Nashville branch of UT was established in 1947 as an exten-
sion college which did not grant degrees. In the late 1960s, the State
began to add to the programs offered at UT-Nashville and announced
plans to develop degree-granting programs. Like the plaintiffs in ASTA
and Norris, the Geier plaintiffs claimed that expanding UT would in-
terfere with TSU's efforts to attract white students.' 33 After suit was
filed, the United States intervened.' 34
Relying on ASTA, the State argued that by adopting race-neutral
admissions criteria, it had satisfied its desegregation obligations.'" The
district court rejected this argument and held that the more stringent
standard of Green applied.'" The mere adoption of an "open door"
policy did not satisfy the State's duty to eliminate its segregated sys-
tem.'" The district court declined to grant injunctive relief which
would prohibit the expansion of UT-Nashville, but rather held that
Tennessee had failed to dismantle its dual system.'" As a result, the
State was ordered to develop a desegregation plan for the court's
approval. 139
After considering a number of proposals during the years follow-
ing the entry of the original decision, in 1972, the district court held
that the defendants were not making satisfactory progress toward im-
plementing the 1968 order to desegregate TSU. 14° The court, there-
131 See Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), enforced sub nom. Geier v.
Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), modified sub nom. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Stipp. 644
(M.D. Tenn. 1977), affd sub nom. Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
132 Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. at 939. At the time Sanders was brought, Tennessee State
University was known as Tennessee Agricultural and industrial State University. For the purposes
of this discussion, the school will be referred to as Tennessee State University.
133 See id. at 943.
134 Id. at 939.
355 Id. at 942.
116
 See id.
1 " Sanders, 288 F. Supp. at 942.
138 Id. at 941-42.
139 Id. at 942.
14° Geier v. Dunn, 337 E Supp. 573, 581 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
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fore, ordered the defendants to develop a plan that would increase the
white presence at TSU."' During the next few years, several plans
were submitted for the court's consideration, but the parties failed to
reach an agreement with respect to any of these proposals. 142 At the
conclusion of a hearing held in 1977, the district court ordered the
State to merge TSU and UT-Nashville. 1 ° The district court's decision
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.'"
Endorsing the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit held that
the Green requirement of an affirmative duty applies to public higher
education as well as to education at the elementary and secondary
school levels."' It also found that the merger remedy was justified
based on "the failure of the defendants to dismantle a statewide dual
system, the 'heart' of which was an all-black TSU." 146
E. The Adams Cases: Recognizing the Educational Value of Black
Colleges
In the early 1970s, a case was decided which was intended to
accelerate the desegregation process but also directed the states to
preserve and enhance black colleges. In Adams v. Richardson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed a district court order which required the United States De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") to enforce Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by cutting off federal funding to states
that had not taken adequate steps to desegregate their public school
systems."7 After finding that HEW had neglected its statutory duty to
enforce Title VI, the D.C. Circuit affirmed a far-reaching order of the
district court which required HEW to establish compliance procedures
and commence enforcement proceedings against several school dis-
tricts that had not taken adequate measures to desegregate their school
systems.' 48
With respect to higher education, the court recognized the con-
tributions of black colleges in providing educational opportunities to
141 M.
142 See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Stipp. 644, 647-49 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
143 /d. at 661.
144 Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1071 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886
(1979).
145 ld. at 1065.
145 M, at 1065, 1067.
147 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 & it.1 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14g See id. at 1164, 1166.
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black students.' 49
 To preserve these institutions, states were required to
develop a policy that "takes into account the special problems of
minority students and of [b]lack colleges ... these [b]lack institutions
currently fulfill a crucial need and will continue to play an important
role in [t)] lack higher education." 15° For the first time, a court acknow-
ledged the distinctive value of black colleges. This recognition was
prompted in large measure by arguments made in an amicus brief filed
by the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Educa-
tion, a voluntary association of the presidents of 110 predominantly
black public and private colleges. 15 ' After Adams, it appeared that black
colleges would not be sacrificed on the alter of integration. This view
was far too optimistic.' 52 Not long after Adams was decided, other court
decisions placed the status of black colleges in immediate jeopardy.'"
F. Judicially Mandated Reorganization as a Response to Continued
Segregation
Much of the current desegregation litigation stems from the states'
inability to resolve the desegregation dilemma without drastic federal
intervention. In 1981, in United States v. Louisiana, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana approved a consent
decree which called for the reorganization of Louisiana's system of
higher education in order to achieve systemic integration.'" 4 The State
of Louisiana operated seventeen institutions of higher learning, four
of which had been originally established as black institutions. In 1974,
the State amended its constitution and spread the responsibility for
governing these institutions among four separate boards. The Board
of Regents had general responsibility for planning and reviewing the
budgets and program offerings at all of the schools. Direct manage-
ment authority was divided among the three remaining boards.
In 1974, the United States commenced an enforcement action
against Louisiana which sought to compel the State to dismantle its
149 Id. at 1165.
156 Id.
151 See id. at 1165 & n.11.
152 For analyses of some of the complex issues raised by the Adams litigation, see Felix V.
Baxter, The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate Institutions of Higher Education—Defining the Role of
the Traditionally Black College, 11 J.L. & Entic. 1, 20-23 (1982); JEAN L. FREER, LAWYERS v.
EDUCATORS: BLACK COLLEGES AND DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, 189-222
(1982).
155 See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 (1992); Geier v. University of Tenn.,
597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
154 527 F. Supp. 509, 511, 514 (E.D. La. 1981).
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segregated system of higher education.'" After years of protracted
negotiations, the parties devised a consent decree which was approved
by the court in 1981.' 56
 Under the terms of that decree, the State
agreed to develop admission and recruitment policies to enhance the
enrollment of other-race students at its white and black institutions. 157
The State also promised to address problems related to student reten-
tion, to eliminate program duplication, to enhance the State's histori-
cally black colleges and to facilitate a more equitable racial balance of
faculty and staff among the various institutions.' 58
In 1987, the United States moved for a hearing on whether Lou-
isiana had implemented the 1981 consent decree and had desegre-
gated its dual system of higher education.' 59 The court found that the
consent decree's structure had not facilitated the disestablishment of
Louisiana's dual system of public universities.' 6° Although it declined
to prepare an alternative remedy, the court recognized that drastic
changes might be needed to achieve desegregation. 161
1. Evidence of Lingering Vestiges of Segregation
The evidence presented at the hearing to vacate the consent
decree in United States v. Louisiana established that the black colleges
were attended primarily by African-American students while the white
colleges served white students.' 62
 These circumstances continued into
1987, six years after the original judgment.'" The court also noted that
the make-up of the four boards which governed Louisiana's twenty
institutions of higher learning remained racially identifiable.' 64
 The
members of the boards that governed the black institutions were pre-
dominantly African-American, while the boards that governed the other
institutions were primarily white.' 65
Evidence presented during a 1989 hearing in this long-running
litigation highlighted a number of shortcomings in Louisiana's sys-
155 1d. at 512.
156 Id. at 513.
157 See id. at 515.
158 Id.
159 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 644 (ED. La. 1988).
16U
 Id. at 658.
161 id.
162 Id. at 644-45.
' 65 1d. at 645.
164 United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 646.
165 See id. The governance responsibility for the black colleges was handled by two separate
boards. Grannbling fell under the jurisdiction of the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and
Universities. Southern University at Baton Rouge, Southern University at New Orleans, and
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tem. 166
 For example, only 33.2% of students who entered Louisiana's
colleges actually graduated within six years: 67
 The national average
for students graduating from public universities within six years was
44.9%. 168
 Although the state system as a whole fell short of the national
average by several objective measures, there were striking disparities in
the performance levels of black and white students. 169
Approximately ninety percent of the freshmen enrolled in the
system were state residents: 7° Twenty-eight percent of the black stu-
dents who graduated from Louisiana high schools enrolled in col-
leges: 7 ' By comparison, forty-two percent the white high school gradu-
ates went on to college. 12
 There were significant disparities in the
grade point averages of black and white students who attended Louisi-
ana's public colleges: 73
 The mean high school GPA for black students
was 2.54, while that of white students was 2.8. 174 There were also sig-
nificant differences in scores that black and white students achieved
on standardized tests. 175
 The mean ACT score for black students was
12.74, while the average score for white students was 18.67.' 76 Among
the students enrolled in colleges, the racial disparities persisted. For
example, 71.7% of the black freshmen were enrolled in remedial
courses: 77
 By comparison, only 38.5% of the white first-year students
participated in remedial programs. 18
During the period in which the 1981 order was in effect, Louisi-
ana's colleges actually became more segregated than they had been
when the decree was entered."' As a result, the court declared that the
State had not complied with the decree, and entered a far-reaching
remedial order which dramatically altered the structure of higher
education in Louisiana.' 8°
Southern University at Shreveport-Boosier City were governed by the Southern University Board
of Supervisors.
ug'United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 505-07 (E.D. La. 1989).
1117 Id. at 505.
I fib Id, at 505416.
169 See id. at 507.
17" Id, at 506.
171
 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 506.
17'2 1d.
175 See id. at 506-507.
174 Id. at 507.
175 See id.
176 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 507.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 504.
] B° See id. at 505, 515-21.
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2. The Remedial Order
With the exception of the law schools at Southern University and
Louisiana State University, the court declined to order a merger of the
black and white colleges. 18 ' Rather, the court suggested that such a
merger would be the next step if the goals of the 1989 remedial order
were not satisfied within five years.'" The law school at Southern
University was ordered to be merged with the law school at Louisiana
State University ("LSU"). 183 Based on a persistently low bar passage rate
and other academic factors, the court found that Southern University
was not providing an acceptable level of training to its students. 184 The
court also considered the proximity of the two schools, both located
in Baton Rouge, and the fact that their programs were identical.' 85 To
ameliorate the effect of the merger on minority students, the court
required LSU Law School to set aside ten percent of the seats in each
incoming class for black students to increase racial diversity at the
school.'s" The merger was to take place over a five-year period.' 87
With respect to system-wide reforms, the court ordered the com-
plete reorganization of the governing structure.' 88 Existing boards were
disbanded and their powers were transferred to a single governing
authority, consisting of seventeen voting members and one student
member. 1 "J The court also required the State to implement a three-
tiered classification scheme which would be based on the availability
of graduate programs and the relative selectivity of admission require-
ments. 19° LSU was to be designated as the flagship institution."' The
State was ordered to establish an intermediate level of institutions that
would offer limited doctoral and other graduate programs.'" The
remaining tier of schools would receive a "comprehensive" designa-
tion, which meant that they would offer fewer graduate programs and
maintain the most relaxed admission requirements.'"
181 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 518-19.
1s2 /d. at 521.
183 /d. at 519.
184 1d. at 513.
185 Id.
186 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F, Supp, at 514.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 515.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 516-17.
191 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp, at 516.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 516-17.
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To facilitate a racial mix at the affected institutions, the court
required that ten percent of the spots in the entering class of each
institution be reserved for other-race students.' 94 To maintain inte-
grated enrollments, graduate program duplications were to be elimi-
nated.'" To ensure the attraction of other-race students to what had
been single-race institutions, the court required the State to establish
recruitment programs and scholarships, and to develop relationships
between colleges and high schools.'" In a subsequently issued supple-
mental order, the court ordered the State to desegregate the faculties
and staffs of the institutions and to establish affirmative action pro-
grams.' 97
3. The Justification for the Remedy
After a petition for rehearing was submitted, the court issued a
separate opinion which addressed the issues raised by post-trial mo-
tions.'" The United States argued that, to the extent the order re-
quired schools to reserve a specified percentage of the space in their
entering classes for other-race students, it established a system of racial
quotas which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" The court disagreed, finding that the imposition of
numerical goals in this case was not arbitrary and therefore satisfied
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Arnendment.2°°
The court reasoned that the remedy was justified by its finding of
long-standing discriminatory practices. 2°' Moreover, this finding was
supported by an ample evidentiary record. The court held that the
remedy was narrowly tailored and was not an inflexible quota which
required a specific racial balance. 2°2
The United States also argued that the court was required to
consider race-neutral alternatives before it imposed race-conscious reme-
dies.2°3 The court responded by pointing out that race-neutral remedies
Id. at 517-18.
195 See id. at 517.
196 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 520.
Ig7 Id. at 521, 524.
198 See United States v. Louisiana, 718 E Supp. 525, 527 (E.D. La. 1989) (separate opinion
on post trial motions).
199 Id. at 530. The United States' argument was based on City of Richmond v. J.A. Cram Co.,
in which the Supreme Court held that arbitrary racial quotas violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989)
20() See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 530-31 (post trial motio ns).
2°1 Id. at 530.
2°2 Id.
202 See id.
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had been established by the 1981 consent decree."' The failure of
those efforts justified the imposition of race-conscious measures to
dismantle the long-standing and persistent segregation that existed in
Louisiana's system."'
Southern University was one of several segregated law schools that
were hastily established by Southern states following the Sweatt deci-
sion. 206
 The states hoped to forestall integration by establishing sepa-
rate schools for black students. Nevertheless, Southern University ar-
gued against the merger remedy, claiming, among other things, that
consolidation of the two law schools would penalize minority students
by reducing the legal education opportunities previously available to
them. 267
 In response, the court asserted that, to the extent the merger
curtailed educational opportunities, the increased minority presence
at LSU and the inadequate level of instruction offered at Southern
University combined to offset any diminution in training opportunities
that might result. 208
4. The Appeal
The district court's decision was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In 1993, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Fordice. 209
 The Fifth Circuit evaluated the
district court's decision based on the analytical standards announced
in Fordice. 21 " The court found that the trial court's analysis was flawed
because the initial liability determination in 1988 was premised entirely
on a finding that racial identifiability persisted in Louisiana's colleges
204 See id. at 531.
205 See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 530-31 (post trial motions).
206
 See Harold R. Washington, History and Role of Black Law Schools, 18 HowARn L.J. 385,
404 (1974).
207 United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 533 (post trial motions).
208 See id. at 533-34.
209
 United States v. Louisiana, 9 E3d 1159,1170-71 (5th Cir. 1993). After the initial district
court hearing on the issue of liability in 1988 (692 F. Stipp. 642, (E.D. La. 1988)), hearings were
held before a special master on the remedy. The district court later ordered the parties to
implement the special master's recommendations. United States v. Louisiana, 718 E Stipp. at
515-21. After the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Ayers v. Attain, 914
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (Ayers was the style of Fordice when the case was pending before the Fifth
Circuit), the district court vacated its earlier order and entered a judgment for the defendants.
United States v. Louisiana, 751 E Supp. 606,608 (E.D. La. 1990). When Ayers was reversed by the
Supreme Court, the district court eventually ordered its 1988 liability judgment to be reinstated,
and it entered a modified remedial order in 1992. See United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1163.
21(' United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3i1 at 1164. See infra notes 283-300 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Fordice decision.
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and universities. 211
 In considering the appropriate analytical frame-
work, the court determined that Fordice required "that each suspect
state policy or practice be analyzed to determine whether it is traceable
to the prior de jure system, whether it continues to foster segregation,
whether it lacks sound educational justification, and whether its elimi-
nation is practicable. "212
The Fifth Circuit held that certain parts of the district court's
findings were sufficiently detailed to satisfy the Fordice requirements. 213
These included the district court's 1992 determination of liability
based on Louisiana's open admissions policy and unnecessary program
duplication. 214
 The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court
had implicitly determined that these practices lacked a sound educa-
tional justification.215
The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the trial court did not apply
the correct legal standard in holding that the existence of four separate
governing boards was unconstitutional. 216
 The court explained that, to
constitute a violation under Fordice, a policy must be traceable to the
era of de jure segregation and must have a present segregative effect. 217
Because the governing boards were established by a 1974 amendment
to Louisiana's constitution, years after de jure segregation had ended,
the Fordice standard was inapplicable. 218 As a result, the Fifth Circuit
held that any challenge to the structure of the governing boards
should be controlled by traditional principles of Equal Protection
jurisprudence. 219
The trial court had also found that the State's open admission
policies contributed to the continued segregation of Louisiana's insti-
tutions of higher learning. 22° Considering this finding, the Fifth Circuit
determined that, like the governing boards, It] he open admissions
policy was instituted after Louisiana's de jure segregation ended, and
the [trial] court failed to address the policy's traceability to the State's
prior de jure system.” 221 Consequently, the trial court's finding concern-
ing the open admissions policy was remanded for further considera-
211
 United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1164-65.
212
 /d. at 1164.
213 See id. at 1165.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1166.
216 United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1167.
217 Id. at 1164.
218 Id. at 1166-67.
219
 Id. at 1167.
22° Id.
221
 United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1167.
May 1994)	 BLACK COLLEGES AKIER FORDICE	 661
tion of the traceability of the policy to Louisiana's prior de jure sys-
tem :222
In addition to finding reversible error on the merits of the trial
court's application of the relevant legal standard, the Fifth Circuit also
found that there were a number of disputed factual issues which
warranted the reversal of the trial court's entry of summary judg-
ment.22' Included among these were disputed questions of fact con-
cerning whether unnecessary program duplication existed, disputed
issues of fact regarding the soundness of the educational justification
for maintaining duplicate programs and unresolved questions about
whether the open admission policy fostered continued segregation. 224
Based on these findings, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in that
court.225
G. Beyond Racial Balance: The Knight Litigation
In one of the most recent desegregation cases, the plaintiffs pur-
sued an approach which did not focus exclusively on racial balance in
student enrollments. 226 Their more expansive strategy achieved a result
that is likely to provide a greater degree of educational equality. In
1983, the United States initiated a Title VI enforcement action against
the State of Alabama. 227 A class of private plaintiffs who had filed a
separate action were allowed to intervene. 228 At the conclusion of the
trial in this action, the district court ordered the defendants to submit
to the court a plan to eliminate Alabama's dual system of higher
education.229 The district court's judgement was appealed and ulti-
mately was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. 23° Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
claims without prejudice and ordered the disqualification of the dis-
trict court judge who had presided over the original tria1. 23 ' On re-
222 id.
223 Id. at 1170.
224 Id.
225 1d. at 1171.
226 See United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom. Board of Trustees of Ala. State Univ, v. Auburn Univ., 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
227 United States v. Alabama, 628 F'. Supp. 1137, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1985), rev'd, 828 F.2d 1532
(11th Cir. 1987).
228 id.
229 Id. at 1173.
230 United Slates v. Alabama, 828 F.2d at 1552.
231 Id.
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mand, a new trial was held which resulted in a second judgment for
the plaintiffs on the merits. 232
1. Segregated Education in Alabama
Critical to the result in Knight v. Alabama was the court's focus on
the long and tragic history of segregation in Alabama.'" The opinion
in Knight begins with a detailed history of the century-long struggle of
Alabama's black citizens to obtain equal opportunities in state-sup-
ported higher education.'" The court's synopsis begins in the Recon-
struction era, when the first schools were established to educate black
students. During the same period, former Confederates were engaged
in an intense struggle to suppress the civil rights of black citizens, and
the establishment of educational opportunities for black citizens was
at odds with their campaign to maintain the white-dominated social
and economic order. The State acquiesced in the development of
segregated educational facilities for black students, however, in a sem-
blance of an effort to comply with the "separate but equal" standard
of Plessy v. Ferguson. One critical aspect of the compromise was an
implicit understanding that any opportunities provided for black stu-
dents could not interfere with the development of a superior system
for white students. Eventually, industrial and normal schools were
established to serve black students. These nineteenth-century schools
were hardly institutions of higher learning. They were, in reality, little
more than high schools where black students were permitted to pursue
training in teaching and those trades to which blacks were relegated
by the segregated system.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, segregation was firmly
entrenched in every aspect of political, economic and social relations
in Alabama. Black voters were disenfranchised, and educational oppor-
tunities for blacks were limited to a small number of separate and
demonstrably unequal colleges. These circumstances continued until
the late 1930s, when Alabama and other Southern states were stunned
by the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
which held that the segregated system had to afford equal opportuni-
ties for blacks and whites.'" Alabama considered upgrading its pub-
232 See Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1377-78 (N.D. Ala. 1991), affd in part and reu'd
in par[, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 260-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion or the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Knight.
233 See id. at 1065-1153.
234 See id.
23'3 See 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938).
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licly-funded black colleges and established scholarships for graduate
and professional training at out-of-state institutions. This trend contin-
ued until the Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision in
1954.
After Brown, Alabama pursued a policy of resisting all efforts to
enforce the desegregation decisions of the federal courts. During the
1960s, Governor Wallace defied a federal court order when he at-
tempted to prevent a black student from enrolling in the University of
Alabama.2 "6 Eventually, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution pre-
vailed, and formal resistance gave way following a constitutional stand-
off between the state and federal governments.
However, the elimination of formal racial barriers did not result
in equal educational opportunities for black students. In the years
following the admission of the first black students to the historically
white Alabama colleges, the percentage of African-American students
attending formerly segregated institutions remained negligible. The
black schools remained single-race institutions, and they suffered from
continued under-funding and neglect. These circumstances persisted
until the plaintiffs initiated the Knight litigation.
2. The Present Effects of Past Discrimination
After concluding its lengthy discussion of the history of discrimi-
nation in Alabama's system of higher education, the court in Knight
made a number of findings. It found, among other things, that Auburn
University's admission requirements excluded a disproportionate num-
ber of black applicants. 237 Accordingly, the court concluded that Auburn's
admission requirements violated both Title VI and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 238 The court also held that the prevalence of white con-
trol within the administrative structures of the white institutions was a
clear manifestation of the prior de jure system. 23
 The plaintiffs also
contended that the low percentage of black faculty at the formerly
white institutions contributed to the continuing segregation within the
system.'" The court noted in response that some of the colleges had
instituted adequate faculty recruitment programs.24 ' Other schools (par-
256 See Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1105.
237 Id. at 1165-66. Auburn University is the one of the two major institutions in the state's
system.
235 Id. at 1166.
239 1d. at 1191-92.
240 Id. at 1172-73.
291 Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1190.
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titularly Auburn), however, had established recruitment programs but
failed to implement them, and this was held to be a violation of the
state's desegregation obligation. 242
The operational funding levels and the condition of facilities had,
in the court's view, a direct impact on students' choices of which
institution to attend. 245
 The evidence established a long history of
disproportionate funding between the black and white institutions. 244
Yet, the "State of Alabama [had] made no effort to overcome the
effects of years of discriminatory funding as to the [historically black
universities] . "245
 The court also found that the State had not adequately
funded capital development at its black colleges."
In a departure from earlier cases, the plaintiffs in Knight claimed
that the content of the curriculum offered at the white institutions
perpetuated segregation.247
 They argued that the curriculum reflected
a Eurocentric bias, and that the failure to offer courses reflecting a
broader, multicultural view discouraged black students from attending
white institutions."' Although the plaintiffs offered extensive expert
testimony to support their contentions, the court declined to enter the
battle over curricular content."'
After an exhaustive recitation of its findings of fact, the court
defined the applicable legal standard: "[w] here a state has previously
maintained or established by law a dual school system based upon race,
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to take the necessary
steps 'to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation."'" The court rejected the State's argument that a differ-
ent and less stringent standard applied in the context of higher edu-
cation. 251
 It also found that the decision to attend a particular institu-
242 See id. at 1190-91.
243 Id. at 1209, 1272.
244 See id. at 1192-1270.
246 Id. at 1270.
246 Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1281.
247 Id. at 1333.
248 See id.
246 See id. at 1332-33. The heated debate over Afrocentrism, multiculturalism and curriculum
reform currently occupies center stage in academic circles. Critics of the traditional curriculum
contend that it promotes a white male hierarchy which excludes the ideas and contributions of
women and minorities. See generally Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101
YALE L.J. 1285 (1992). Opponents argue that multiculturalism will lead to fragmentation and
deepening divisions within society. See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF AMER-
ICA: REELECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1991).
266 Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1356 (quoting Swains v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
251 Id. at 1360.
May 19941
	 BLACK COLLEGES AFTER FORDICE 	 665
tion was not the result of unfettered student choice. 252 The court
concluded that "in Alabama there continue to survive some vestiges of
segregation that impede and unduly restrict the exercise of student
choice on the basis of race."253
3. The Remedy
The court's remedial order required Alabama to enhance the
presence of minorities on faculties and within the administrative struc-
tures of the historically white institutions. 254 The State was ordered
to alter its funding formula to assure that the historically black col-
leges received an equitable share of the resources allocated to higher
education.255 Alabama was also required to redirect capital expendi-
tures to improve the buildings and other facilities at the black col-
leges. 2" Admissions policies were to be altered at Auburn. 257 The court
also ordered Alabama to create a committee to eliminate unneces-
sary program duplication. 253 Alabatna State University, an historically
black institution, was ordered to develop plans to recruit white stu-
dents. 259
4. The Appeal
Despite the victory that the plaintiffs obtained in the district court,
they were not satisfied with elements of the trial court's decision. An
appeal was filed. On February 24, 1994, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision which reversed
certain aspects of the district court's ruling:41° The issues on appeal
included the mission designations of two of the black colleges, control
of land grant funding, the curricula at the white colleges and the
campus environments maintained by the white colleges. 2' 1
252 „rd.
255 Id.
254 Id. at 1 378.
255 Knight, 787 F. Stipp. at 1378-79.
25ot See id.
2571d.
258 Id. at 1379-80.
258 Id. at 1380,
26" See Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534,1556-57 (11th Cir. 1994). The appeal was decided
after the Supreme Court's decision in Eordice but Ihe cowl of appeals found that the trial court
"anticipated in considerable measure the standards later set out by the Court in Eordiee." Id. at
1540.
2 '' 1 Id. at 1540.
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The plaintiffs argued that two of the black colleges, Alabama State
University ("ASU") and Alabama A & M ("A&M"), had inferior mission
designations that were traceable to the era of de jure segregation.'"
They sought an order that would require the sharing of "flagship" and
other high-prestige programming with the historically black institu-
tions." The Eleventh Circuit found that the trial court had addressed
the question of whether mission assignments were vestiges of a dis-
criminatory system, but did not determine whether ASU or A&M's
limited mission designations continued to have a segregative effect on
student choice.'" As a result, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case
to the trial court to determine whether the mission assignments do
indeed have a segregative effect and, if so, whether there are sound
policies that would reduce or eliminate the segregative effects of those
practices. 26"
The plaintiffs also claimed that Auburn University's control of a
disproportionate share of land grant funding was a vestige of Ala-
bama's discriminatory system that continued to have segregative ef-
fect. 26" The Eleventh Circuit observed that the district court had found
that the disproportionate allocation of land grant funding was the
result of discriminatory practices, but even if discrimination had not
been involved, Alabama would probably have chosen to place the
funding under the control of a single institution, and that institution,
in all likelihood, would have been Auburn. 267
The Eleventh Circuit reversed this finding because it disagreed
with the trial court's analysis of causation.'" The Eleventh Circuit
found that "it simply does not logically follow that the vestige of
segregation about which plaintiffs complain would have occurred not-
withstanding the discriminatory state actions."'" Consequently, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded this issue with instructions that the trial
court consider whether the current funding allocation has a continu-
ing segregative effect.'" If such a finding is made, the trial court will
be obligated to determine whether the segregative effects can be reme-
died with sound educational practices. 27 '
262 Id. at 1543.
263
 Id. at 1544.
264 Id.
at Knight, 14 F.3d at 1546.
266
 Id. at 1547.
267 /d. at 1549.
2124 1d. at 1549, 1551.
2° Id. at 1550.
27u
	 14 F.3d at 1551.
271 Id.
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The plaintiffs also claimed that climates of racial hostility existed
on the campuses of Alabama's historically white colleges. 27tThe Elev-
enth Circuit noted that the trial court found no evidence that any
institution had a policy or practice of maintaining a racially inhospita-
ble climate.'" This ruling was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. 274
Finally, in what was likely the most significant ruling on appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the trial court's ruling on
the issue of curricular content. 2" During the trial, the plaintiffs argued
that African-American thought, culture and history were not ade-
quately represented in the curricula of the white institutions. 27" They
claimed that this deficiency was traceable to the era of de jure segre-
gation and that it continued to have a segregative effect. 277 The trial
court had found that curricular content was a matter protected by the
principle of academic freedom which was best left to the discretion of
the institutions. 278
When the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue, it found that some
deference was owed to academic institutions to determine what would
be taught, but academic freedom does not constitute an absolute bar
to judicial intervention when a violation of a constitutional right is at
stake.279 Thus, the trial court's finding was reversed and remanded for
reconsideration in light of the Eleventh Circuit's decision. 28° The trial
court was specifically directed to:
[D]etermine whether the curricula at the different HWIs
[(Historically White Institutions)] are indeed deficient in the
degree to which they incorporate black thought, culture, and
history. The court should then proceed to determine whether
that marginalization, if any, is traceable to Alabama's past
regime of segregation and discrimination and, if so, whether,
by itself or in combination with other vestiges of segregation,
it has continuing segregative effects on student choice. Fi-
nally, if the court concludes that any identified vestigial deficien-
cies indeed have such an effect, it should evaluate the full
272 1d. at 1553.
273 1d.
271 Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's finding that the white institutions
were doing all they could do to combat racial hostility was not clearly erroneous. Id.
275 See Knight, 14 F.3d at 1553.
276 /d. at 1552.
277 1d.
278 Id .
271 /d. at 1552-53.
28° See Knight, 14 F.3d at 1553.
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range of possible alternative remedies to determine whether
any alternative is practicable and educationally sound. 28 '
What distinguishes Knight from the earlier cases is the plaintiffs'
innovative approach to articulating their claims and presenting their
evidence. The Knight plaintiffs viewed the situation in Alabama not
simply in terms of racial balance in the student population. Rather,
they emphasized administration and faculty composition, infrastruc-
ture disparities and curricular content. The detailed presentation of
the longstanding and deeply rooted history of racial subordination
enabled the court to link century-old events to the current state of
education in Alabama. The plaintiffs demonstrated how these events
combined to produce gross disparities in the present system. Because
of this approach, the plaintiffs established that discriminatory practices
were not, as the Supreme Court had found in other contexts, societal
discrimination, which is too "amorphous" a basis for imposing habil-
ity. 282
 Rather, the State's conduct and the resulting injuries were
sufficiently immediate and palpable to justify the far-reaching remedies
that the district court ordered. Every aspect of Alabama's higher edu-
cation was challenged, including the key areas of curriculum, admini-
stration and faculty composition. This strategy struck at the heart of
the white-dominated hierarchy that existed within the educational
establishment, and it may serve as a model for future desegregation
litigation. Unfortunately, this multifaceted approach was not utilized
in the case that finally reached the United States Supreme Court.
V. UNITED STATES V. FORDICE: THE NEUTRALITY STANDARD
REJECTED
In United States v. Fordice, the United States Supreme Court finally
addressed the obligation of former de jure states to desegregate their
institutions of higher education.288 Fordice was filed in 1975, after the
State of Mississippi failed for several years to submit an acceptable
desegregation plan to HEW. 284
 The State operated eight separate insti-
tutions, three of which, Alcorn State University, Jackson State Univer-
sity and Mississippi Valley State University, were established prior to
Brown as separate schools for black students.
281 Id.
282
 See Wygant Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (justice Powell objecting to
an assertion of "societal discrimination" as a basis for ordering race-conscious remedies).
283 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1992).
284
 Id. at 2732-33.
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After years of unsuccessful negotiations, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held, in 1987, that Mis-
sissippi had not violated its obligation to desegregate its colleges and
universities. 285 Rejecting the applicability of the Green standard, the trial
court reasoned that "the affirmative duty to desegregate does not
contemplate either restricting choice or the achievement of any degree
of racial balance."28° The court concluded that the desegregation obli-
gation was satisfied when policies and practices adopted by a state were
race-neutral, adopted in good faith and did not contribute to the
continued racial identifiability of a particular institution:287 After pro-
tracted deliberation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the district court's holding that
because universities differ fundamentally from secondary and elemen-
tary schools, the Green standard did not apply.288 The Fifth Circuit
found that Mississippi had satisfied its obligation to desegregate its
prior de jure system by implementing race-neutral policies governing
the operation of its schools. 28"
The Fifth Circuit relied upon the holding in Bazemore v. Friday to
permit the adoption of race-neutral criteria as the standard for deter-
mining whether a state had satisfied its desegregation obligation. 29° In
Bazemore, the United States Supreme Court found that the continued
existence of segregated Four-H clubs in North Carolina was the prod-
uct of voluntary choices made by individual members. 291 Because the
continuing segregation was the result of voluntary choices, and the
Four-H admissions policy was facially neutral, the Court found that the
continued existence of single-race clubs did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 292
Extending the Bazemore reasoning, the Fifth Circuit, in Ayers v.
Attain, found that the decision to attend a particular college was a
voluntary choice made by an individual student. 298 This distinguished
higher education cases from the elementary and high school context
285 Ayers v. Main, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1564 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), vacated sub nom. and remanded, United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
286 1d. at 1553.
287 See id. at 1554.
2x8 Ayers v, Main, 914 F.2d 676, 686 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated sub nom. and remanded,
United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
289 See Ayers, 914 17.2d at 692.
299 Id. at 082 (citing 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring)).
291 See 478 U.S. at 408 (1986) (Whited., concurring). The Court adopted the reasoning of
this part of Justice White's concurrence by reference. Id. at 387.
292 Id. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
293 914 F.2d at 686-87.
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where school attendance was mandatory. 294 Applying this reasoning,
the court held that continued segregation in Mississippi's public col-
leges did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because it was not
the result of racially motivated state policies. 295
When Fordice reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court
rejected the standard which the Fifth Circuit had applied and held that
the implementation of race-neutral policies alone does not satisfy a
state's obligation to dismantle formerly segregated systems. 296 The Court
also noted that when "policies traceable to the de jure system are still
in force and have discriminatory effects, those policies too must be
reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educa-
tional practices."297
Although it declined to embrace the precise contours of Green,
the Court categorically rejected the application of the neutrality stand-
ard of ASIA and the freedom of choice premise of Bazemore. 298 The
Court proceeded to apply its newly formulated standard to Mississippi's
actions, in order to determine whether policies adopted during the era
of segregation contributed to the current condition of Mississippi's
public universities. 299 The Court found that four policies continued to
have a segregative effect."
A. Vestiges of De Pure Discrimination
Included among the policies that the Court found to have a
continuing segregative effect were the differing admission policies
used at the eight institutions."' The trustees of the university system
had adopted an admissions standard which was based entirely on the
ACT scores of the high school graduates who applied. The historically
white institutions required much higher minimum scores than the
black colleges. Meanwhile, in Mississippi, seventy-two percent of the
white high school graduates achieved a composite score of fifteen or
better while fewer than thirty percent of the black graduates achieved
a score of fifteen or better." The standardized test requirement was
adopted in 1963 when Mississippi was actively resisting school desegre-
294 See id,
2"3 Id. at 692.
291 '14'w-dice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736.
297 Id.
298
 See id. at 2737 & n.5.
299 Id, at 2738.
3°') Id.
391 See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2738-39.
992 Id. at 2739.
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gation. The test's exclusionary effect on black students was known at
the time it was implemented." Based on this evidence, the Court
found that the differential admission requirements were "remnants of
the dual system with a continuing discriminatory effect." 3°4
In addition to the differential admission requirements, the Court
also found that there was widespread duplication of programs among
Mississippi's eight colleges. 305
 The Court was also critical of the State's
mission classifications.°t' The white schools that served as the flagship
institutions of the system were designated as "comprehensive" facilities.
They received the lion's share of funding and other resources. None
of the three black colleges received the "comprehensive" designation.
By comparison, they continued to receive a disproportionately small
share of the total funding and resources that Mississippi allocated to
higher education.
The Court found that the schools' mission designations combined
with admission policies and program duplication perpetuated a segre-
gated system. 507
 The Court was also critical of Mississippi's decision to
operate eight separate institutions, when it seemed clear that doing so
was "wasteful and irrational."" Although it did not compel Mississippi
to take any actions to ameliorate this inefficiency, the Court indicated
that "closure of one or more institutions would decrease the discrimi-
natory effects of the present system." 30'
B. Tim Denial of the Equalization Remedy
Although the United States prevailed in Fordice, in reality Jake
Ayers and the other private plaintiffs lost."' The individual plaintiffs
sought an order which would have required upgrading the historically
black colleges."' What they wanted, in effect, was an equalization
remedy reminiscent of the relief sought in the pre-Brown cases.
The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that it would not
endorse this approach. 512
 It found that perpetuating a separate but
" See id. at 2738-39.
0" Id. at 2739.
"5 Id, at 2740.
"Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
°7 1d. at 2738.
305 See id. at 2742.
"9 Id. at 2742-43.
310 See generally Wendy R. Brown, The Convergence of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the
State's Affirmative. Duty To Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L. REV. 63 (1992)
(criticizing Supreme Court's decontextualized and ahistoric approach to Fardice).
311 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at. 2743.
312 See id.
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"more equal" system would not satisfy Mississippi's duty to dismantle
its segregated educational system.313 Although it rejected the private
plaintiffs' request to allow the black schools to remain as "publicly
financed, exclusively black enclaves by private choice,"s 14 the Court
seemed to leave the door open for the continued operation of the
black schools. At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court indicated
that an increase in funding for black schools might be necessary to
achieve complete disestablishment of the segregated system, but left
that issue for the district court to address on remand. 31 ' This suggests
that the Supreme Court would endorse upgrading black colleges only
if doing so would attract white students and operate to eliminate the
racial identifiability of the schools.
C. The Impact of Fordice on Publicly -Funded Black Colleges
The standard announced in Fordice leaves the future of publicly-
funded black colleges in considerable doubt. The Supreme Court
rejected an analytical framework that would have permitted states to
comply by adopting race-neutral admission policies, and instead obli-
gated states to do more. The extent of this obligation remains unclear.
After Fordice, practices which are traceable to a de jure system and
perpetuate segregation must be justified or eliminated.
The most visible vestiges of de jure segregation are the black
public colleges that were established during the "separate but equal"
era. These institutions are traceable to state enforced racial segrega-
tion; they contribute to the persistence of segregation to the extent
that they attract black students who would otherwise attend white
colleges. In fact, in Geier v. University of Tennessee, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that black public institu-
tions were at the "heart" of the segregated system. 3 '6 It would appear,
therefore, that Fordice requires the elimination of black colleges, unless
there is a sound educational justification for their continued existence.
In other contexts, however, the courts and the federal government
have recognized the educational justification for black colleges and
have encouraged states to ensure their preservation. Congress enacted
legislation which, among other things, provides for direct financial
assistance to black colleges. 317 In Adams v. Richardson, the United States
51 '4 Id.
314 Id.
315 See id.
516 See 597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
317 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060-1063c (1989 & Supp. 1993).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to require states
to develop desegregation plans that would preserve black institutions,'''
Moreover, it is important to note that most of the litigation involv-
ing black colleges was brought by supporters seeking to forestall ac-
tions which posed a danger to the continued existence of a particular
institution. The ASTA plaintiffs wanted to preserve Alabama State
Teachers College. The Geier plaintiffs were seeking to protect and
improve Tennessee State University. Similarly, the Nonis plaintiffs wanted
to protect Virginia State College, another publicly-funded black col-
lege. Finally, the plaintiffs in Fordice were not seeking admission to the
University of Mississippi. What they wanted was a remedy which would
require Mississippi to upgrade Alcorn State, Jackson State and Missis-
sippi Valley State. Nevertheless, in Fordice and other cases, the argu-
ments made by the black plaintiffs have been met with a deafear. When
they urged the courts to grant a remedy which would enhance the
quality of black schools, the courts questioned the sincerity of the
plaintiff? motives and were unwilling or unable to comprehend the
concerns of the parties who had the greatest stake in the litigation.
D. The Department of Education's Reaction to Fordice
On January 31, 1994, the United States Department of Education
issued a "Notice of Application of Supreme Court. Decision" in the
Federal Registers" The notice announced the impact of Fordice on the
procedures that the Department of Education will follow when it in-
vestigates states with a history of operating de jure segregated systems
of higher education. 32° The Department of Education found that the
Fordice decision was consistent with existing Department of Education
regulations which require an examination of a broad range of factors
to determine whether state policies or practices tend to perpetuate a
formerly de jure system of segregation. 32 ' After noting that Fordice
ratified the Department's longstanding position that states have an
affirmative duty to dismantle their formerly de jure systems, the De-
partment stated, "OCR [the Office for Civil Rights] will apply the
standard set out in Fordice, requiring the elimination of the vestiges of
prior de jure segregation, to all pending Title VI evaluations of state-
"See 480 F.2d 1159, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
.519 Nolice of Application of Supreme Court Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 4271 (1994).
92" See id. at 4272.
321
 See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100 (1993)).
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wide higher education systems with OCR-accepted desegregation plans
that have expired."322
Significantly, the Department re-affirmed its commitment to pre-
serving black colleges; a commitment that it had established in the
wake of the Adams litigation. The notice provides that:
States may not place unfair burdens upon black students and
faculty in the desegregation process. Moreover, the Depart-
ment's "Revised Criteria" recognize that State systems of higher
education may be required, in order to overcome the effects
of past discrimination, to strengthen and enhance tradition-
ally or historically black institutions. The Department will
strictly scrutinize State proposals to close or merge tradition-
ally or historically black institutions, and any other actions
that might impose undue burdens on black students, faculty,
or administrators or diminish the unique roles of those insti-
tutions.323
This interpretation, which was issued by the federal agency which
has primary responsibility for the enforcement of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, has profound implications for the continued exist-
ence of publicly-funded black colleges. It ratifies an earlier federal
commitment to the preservation of black colleges and implicitly
acknowledges the importance of these institutions in providing
educational opportunities to black students. The Department of
Education's position is consistent with the views of supporters of
black colleges and rejects the notion that the burden of desegrega-
tion must be borne by black institutions.
VI. THE EDUCATIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR BLACK COLLEGES
Supporters of black colleges believe that these institutions possess
"qualities which are incapable of objective measurement" and provide
a valuable educational experience to black students. 324
 Unlike white
colleges, black colleges have never engaged in race-exclusive admission
practices. They provide, among other things, nurturing environments
that are free from the racial tension that is so prevalent on many
campuses in the United States. Black schools afford opportunities to
serve in leadership capacities that are limited at white colleges.
52.9
524
 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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These institutions have a long tradition of excellence which is
grounded in the civil rights movement. Years before the civil rights
struggle became the mass movement of the 1960s, lawyers at Howard
University developed and implemented the legal strategy to combat
segregation which ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court victories
of the 1940s and 19505. 325 An important element of this strategy in-
volved training and developing a generation of black lawyers who
served as leaders in the effort to secure the constitutional rights of
black Americans. During the 1930s and 1940s, Howard University law
students were inculcated with a special sense of mission that enabled
them to accomplish the enormous task that they confronted as lawyers.
Under the leadership of Charles Houston and others, this vision be-
came an integral component of the legal training at Howard. A gen-
eration later, students at black colleges provided the leadership for the
protest marches, sit-ins and voter registration drives of the 1960s. 326
These traditions survive at the black colleges, which continue to pro-
duce the majority of black leaders. 327
Perhaps most importantly, African-American culture and accom-
plishment are essential ingredients in the curriculum at black colleges.
These attributes cannot be replicated at white universities where black
students are marginalized and the program of study ignores the con-
tributions of African-Americans to art, literature and the sciences.
The paradox of the arguments made in favor of black colleges is
that they seem in some ways to be the same as claims that were made
by defenders of segregation when Brown was argued. They could be
323 See, generally Leland Ware, A Difference In Emphasis: Charles Hauston's Thinsfomnalion of
Legal Education, 32 Hownito L. 479 (1989) (discussing contributions of Howard University
School of Law to the Civil Rights Movement).
326 See generally TAYLOR BRANCA!, PARTING TIM WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1953—
1963 (1988); DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOU'T'HERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
327 In a recent article reflecting sentiments within the black community, two commentators
expressed grave concerns about the survival of black colleges. See jammie Briggs & Lori S.
Robinson, Black Colleges Under Fire, EMERGE, Sept. 1993, at 27. With respect to the continuing
need for black colleges, the authors pointed out that
While [historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs)1 enroll less than 18
percent of the 1.3 million blacks attending college, they award 34 percent of the
baccalaureate degrees. Black colleges were the undergraduate source for nearly 50
percent of the country's black Ph.D.s from 1986-1992, according to the United
Negro College Fund. The National Urban League stated in one of its "State of Black
America" reports that HBCUs produce 70 percent of the black elected officials, 80
percent of the black lawyers and judges, and 85 percent of the black doctors. These
numbers show that black colleges are just as vital now as they were when blacks
were barred from white schools.
Id.
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construed as accepting the Plessy rationale that separate but equal
schools for black students would be preferable, or at least as good as
receiving an education in an integrated environment. These argu-
ments may seem to be at odds with the integrationist principle of
Brown, but the plaintiffs in Fordice were not seeking a return to segre-
gation. What they desired was something fundamentally different—the
preservation of black institutions.
The Brown litigation aimed at eliminating the relegation of stu-
dents to a separate and under-funded system of segregated institutions.
Institutions established during the era of segregation managed to
educate thousands of black students, even with the considerable con-
straints imposed by limited resources. The success of these colleges is
a testament to their capacity to prevail against tremendous odds. The
elimination of de jure segregation does not mean that these institu-
tions are no longer needed.
Despite the fact that hundreds of white institutions are eager to
increase their minority enrollment, a rapidly increasing portion of the
pool of college-bound African-American students are opting to attend
black colleges. 328 One reason for this decision is the perception that
black colleges have a firmly established track record of successfully
educating black students. There is a profound dissonance in the way
these institutions are viewed by African-Americans and the way they
are perceived by other groups. Much of the abundant literature on
black colleges focuses on objective features: the number of professors
who possess Ph.D.s, the number of volumes in the library, the size and
condition of the physical plant, and the average test scores of entering
freshmen. In one relatively recent article, the author examined, in
painstaking detail, the history of publicly-funded black colleges. 329 Af-
ter an exhaustive examination of the data, the author concluded that
black colleges were inferior to white colleges with respect to funding,
the availability of academic programs, the quality of instruction, the
research facilities and virtually every other objective measure. The
author's intent was to demonstrate that former de jure states were still
operating separate and unequal systems of higher education. The
author's conclusion—that black colleges are neglected and grossly
under-funded—is a fact that no one can seriously dispute. This neglect
and under-funding has been demonstrated time and time again, be-
328 In 1980 there were 185,780 black students enrolled in black colleges. By 1991 that number
had increased to 213,904. This is occurring at a time when enrollment rates at white colleges are
declining. On the Superiority of Black Colleges, 1 J. Bukcits IN HIGIIER Enuc. 60, 65 (1993).
32')
 See Ku jovich, supra note 14.
May 1994]	 BLACK COLLEGES APTEI? FORDICE	 677
ginning with the NAACP's equalization litigation in the 1930s. The
question which has not been adequately explored by researchers is how
these neglected and grossly under-funded institutions were able to
perform so well for so long under such adverse conditions. One won-
ders what more impressive results are likely to be produced with ade-
quate resources.
State governments, university administrators and other educational
policy makers are understandably confused by the conflicting signals
they are receiving from the courts and from federal agencies. On the
one hand, courts order them to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination.
On the other, supporters of black colleges demand the preservation
and enhancement of black schools.
It is, of course, difficult to raise minority enrollments at white
colleges when a substantial number of minority candidates are electing
to attend black colleges. From a policy perspective, states would be
better served by taking actions to increase the pool of minority college
students. This could be accomplished by creating programs that would
improve the preparation minority students receive in elementary and
high schools. College is the continuation of a long-term educational
process, where it is difficult to remedy problems that have developed
at earlier stages. The focus should be on elementary and high schools
in urban areas, where the vast majority of black students attend school,
and where the quality of educational services is most lacking. The
economic disparities between urban and suburban school districts are
at the heart of the nation's failure to educate minority children."°
To the extent that inner-city children are able to overcome the
inadequacies of urban schools, black colleges may be one of the best
environments in which to make the transition from the isolation of the
inner-cities to careers in a larger society. All educational policy-making
should proceed from the premise that the vast majority of black chil-
dren are being educated in poor, isolated and hyper-segregated com-
munities. The residents of these communities often dress differently,
speak a dialect other than Anglo-American English and have different
cultural norms. Poverty and violence are part of the landscape in these
areas, but what policy-makers fail to recognize is that this pool of
students includes thousands of potential professionals and entrepre-
neurs who merely lack adequate training. Black colleges have trained
generations of African-American leaders who emerged from similar
350 See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1991); SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Derrick Bell ed.,
1980) (discussing the difficulties of educating minority children).
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backgrounds. These institutions are a precious and irreplaceable asset
which should not be sacrificed to promote a superficial form of deseg-
regation which measures success solely by the percentage of black
students enrolled in white colleges. This will never substitute for true
educational parity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Shortly after Broum was decided, W.E.B. DuBois sounded a somber
note of caution:
[In racially] mixed schools, [black children will] suffer for
years from southern white teachers and white hoodlums who
sit beside them and under school authorities from janitors to
superintendents who hate and despise them . . . . The best
Negro teachers will largely go because they will not and can-
not teach what many white folk will long want taught. Much
teaching of Negro history will leave the school and with it that
brave story of Negro resistance."'
The fact that what DuBois anticipated came to pass should not be
a complete surprise. The main failure of school desegregation efforts
was that federal courts conceptualized equality exclusively in terms
of racial balance within educational institutions. Federal judges pre-
sumed that demands for an end to racial discrimination were prompted
by the desire of African-Americans to assimilate into the majority's
culture. By the 1960s, however, black activists recognized the flaws in
this assumption and began to encourage African-Americans to develop
an appreciation for the unique contributions of their own culture.
This goal has not yet been accomplished. The current approach
to education fails to acknowledge the actual basis of American culture.
It is not entirely the product of European antecedents. In reality, it
reflects infusions from the various groups that have combined to create
that which is truly "American." For example, to the extent that there
is a uniquely American form of music, it consists of jazz, rhythm and
blues, and the various adaptions made by white musicians to music
originally developed by black artists. Similarly, numerous inflections of
American speech echo the rhythms of the African-American idiom.
There are many other examples, but the point is that the accomplish-
"I W.E.B. DuBois, Two Hundred Years of Segregated Schools, JEWISH LIFE ANTHoLoGY 1946-
1956, at 201-06 (1956), reprinted in PHILIP S. FONER, W.E.B. DuBois SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND
ADDRESSES 283 (1970).
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ments of the dominant group within the population have been empha-
sized, while the considerable contributions of people of color have
been consistently discounted.
What is missing is an educational system which acknowledges the
critical role of black Americans and other people of color in the
development of American culture. An unstated yet unmistakable as-
sumption of white superiority is being communicated to both black
students and white students in "integrated" schools. The stigma that
results is no different from the harm that the Supreme Court found
so injurious in Brown. What is needed within the educational estab-
lishment is a redefinition of American culture: one that celebrates all
those important aspects that have been studiously ignored for so many
years. There may come a time when white institutions become fully
integrated in terms of curriculum, equality and educational perspec-
tive. But even if that occurs, there will still be a justification for the
continued existence of black colleges.
The dilemma of the cultural relationships between white and
black Americans was captured by playwright August Wilson, who, when
asked why he demanded a black director for the film version of his
Pulitzer Prize winning play Fences, stated the following:
As Americans of various races, we share a broad cultural
ground, a commonality of society that links its diverse ele-
ments into a cohesive whole that can be defined as "Amer--
can. 
11
We share certain mythologies. A history. We share political
and economic systems and a rapidly developing, if suspect,
ethos. Within these commonalities are specifics. Specific ideas
and attitudes that are not shared on the common cultural
ground. These remain the property and possession of the
people who develop them, and on that "field of manners
and rituals of intercourse" (to use James Baldwin's eloquent
phrase) lives are played out.
At the point where they intercept and link to the broad
commonality of American culture, they influence how that
culture is shared and to what purpose.
White American society is made up of various European
ethnic groups which share a common history and sensibility.
Black Americans are a racial group which do not share the
same sensibilities. The specifics of our cultural history are
very much different.
We are an African people who have been here since the
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early 17th century. We have a different way of responding to
the world. We have different ideas about religion, different
manners of social intercourse. We have different ideas about
style, about language. We have different esthetics.
Someone who does not share the specifics of a culture
remains an outsider, no matter how astute a student or how
well-meaning their intentions.332
When educators begin to value the differences to which August
Wilson referred, we may begin to approach an answer to the prob-
lem of educating black students.
532 August Wilson, I Want a Black Director, N.Y. Timits, Sept 26, 1990, at A25.
